China's Military Capabilities | IDDS

By Frank W Moore, IDDS Research Analyst
INTRODUCTION

In the past decade China's growing military capability hasattracted a great deal of attention, but details about the currentand likely near-future state of China's military power have beenin short supply. While it is true that China is modernizing itsforces and increasing defense spending, the prospective improvementsin overall military capability need to be set against the verylow-technology starting point of China's armed forces.

The article begins by lookingat recent trends and likely future developments in China's nuclearand conventional forces. It then discusses potential militarycourses of action by China towards Taiwan, now and in the future.

CHINA'S NUCLEAR FORCES

According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists andthe SIPRI Yearbook 1999, the size of the Chinese nucleararsenal is about 400 warheads. The Bulletin estimates that20 nuclear-armed missiles are deployed in the intercontinentalrole, and another 230 nuclear weapons on deployed (or can be deployed)on aircraft, missiles, and submarines with regional capabilities.The 150 remaining nuclear warheads are believed to be reservedfor "tactical" uses (short-range missiles, low yieldaircraft-dropped bombs, and possibly artillery shells or demolitionmunitions).1

Nuclear weapons in China areunder the control of the Central Military Commission, which isheaded by the President. Other members of the commission are generalsfrom the People's Liberation Army (PLA), who may also serve onthe Politburo of the Communist Party.

Intercontinental Nuclear Forces

China currently maintains a minimal intercontinental nucleardeterrent using land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs). The Dong Feng-5 (DF-5) liquid-fueled missile, first deployedin 1981, has a range of 13,000 km and carries a single multi-megatonwarhead. Twenty are believed to be deployed in central China,southwest of Beijing. Unlike China's earlier ballistic missiles,which were stored in caves and moved out for launch, the DF-5can be launched directly from vertical silos—but only aftera two-hour fueling process. In order to increase the survivabilityof the DF-5s, dummy silos are placed near the real silos. TheDF-5's range gives it coverage of all of Asia and Europe, andmost of the United States. The south-eastern US states are atthe edge of the missile's range.

Two additional long-range ballisticmissiles are in the development stage, the 8,000 km DF-31 andthe 12,000 km DF-41. Both missiles are expected to be solid-fueledand based on mobile launchers. It is not known how many missilesChina plans to deploy nor how many warheads the missiles may carry,but it is believed that China is hoping to deploy multiple nuclearwarheads and penetration aids. These may be either multiple re-entryvehicles (MRVs) or the more capable, but technically difficultmultiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Firstdeployment for the DF-31 could occur before 2005; the DF-41 islikely to follow, possibly around 2010.2

China's nuclear-armed navalforces are currently limited to one Xia Type 092 nuclear-poweredand nuclear ballistic missile-equipped submarine (SSBN), whichhas a history of reactor and acoustic problems. The Xia can carry12 Ju Lang-1 (JL-1) SLBMs with a single 200-300 kt warhead anda range of 1,700 km. Due to its technical limits, the Type 092is never deployed outside regional waters.

China is reported to be planningto build four-to-six new Type 094 SSBNs. The Type 094 will introducea safer, quieter reactor and better overall performance. It isexpected to have 16 JL-2 missiles, capable of carrying up to sixwarheads per missile (probably MRVs that are not independentlytargetable). The initial launch date is supposed to be scheduledfor 2002; but development of the JL-2 missile may take considerablylonger because to date the land-based missile on which it based,the DF-31, has been test launched only once. If China were toemploy a deployment rotation similar to that for US Navy SSBNs(three submarines for each one in target range, with one on station,one in transit, and one in refit), then six SSBNs would give Chinathe ability to keep two submarines on station in the Pacific atall times, able to strike all of Asia, Europe, and North America.3If the planned 6 submarines are built with the maximum numberof warheads per missile, the number of total deployable submarine-basednuclear warheads will rise to 576. Even if the warheads were notindependently targetable, the minimum number likely to be on stationand capable of striking the United States would be 192—thatis, enough to saturate the proposed light US national missiledefense, which is now driving the Chinese strategic nuclear modernizationand expansion program.

Regional Nuclear Forces

China also deploys three weapons in the intermediate-rangeballistic missile (IRBM) and medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)categories. These missiles are capable of posing strategic threatsto countries in Asia, such as India or Japan, but represent alesser threat to Russia, and are only a threat to the United Statesthrough the vulnerability of US military bases in Japan and SouthKorea.

The oldest nuclear missiledeployed by China is the semi-mobile 2,800 km-range DF-3A. Theestimated 40 liquid-fueled DF-3s still in service today are beingphased out in favor of the DF-15 (see below) and DF-21. They werefollowed by the liquid-fueled DF-4, which has a maximum rangeof 4,750 km. About 20 DF-4s remain in service in fixed launchsights. Chinese regional ballistic missile capabilities advancedgreatly with the introduction of the DF-21, the first solid-fueledmedium-range missile. The solid-fuel design provides China witha faster launch time, because the lengthy and potentially dangerousfueling procedure of the earlier Dong Feng models has been eliminated.First deployed in 1986, the 48 operational DF-21s have a rangeof 1,800 km and are carried on mobile launchers. The DF-21 isthe basis for the JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

The older liquid-fuel missilescarry single warheads with yields estimated at 3.3 MT. The newersolid-fuel missiles have single warheads with maximum yields ofa few hundred kilotons each.

The Chinese bomber force isbased on locally produced versions of Soviet aircraft first deployedin the 1950s. With the retirement of the H-5/Il-28 from the nuclearrole, the H-6/Tu-16 remains the only nuclear-capable bomber inthe Chinese inventory. First entering service with the SovietAir Force in 1955, the Tu-16 was produced in China in the 1960s.The H-6/Tu-16 is capable of carrying one-to-three nuclear bombsover a combat radius of 1,800 km to 3,100 km. About 120 People'sLiberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) H-6/Tu-16s are believed to becapable of nuclear missions. Another 20 H-6/Tu-16s are under thecontrol of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and do notperform nuclear missions. There is no indication of a replacementfor the H-6/Tu-16 in the near future. The J-7/MiG-21 and the newerChinese-designed JH-7s and Russian-exported Su-27s are capableof performing nuclear missions, but they are not believed to bedeployed in that role.

Short-Range, Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons

The PLAAF has 20-40 Q-5 Fantan attack aircraft that it usesin the nuclear role. Initially deployed in China in 1970, theQ-5 is a substantially upgraded version of the MiG-19, which wasinitially deployed in the Soviet Union in 1954 and later producedby China under the designation J-6. The Q-5 can carry a singlefree-fall nuclear bomb over a combat radius of 400 km. The veryshort range of the Q-5 limits its battlefield effectiveness, evenwith conventional armament.

Two types of short-range ballisticmissile (SRBM) entered service with China’s Second Artilleryforces around 1995: the DF-11/M-11, with a range of 300 km, andthe DF-15/M-9, with a range of 600 km. (The ‘DF’ designationis used by missiles in service with China, while the ‘M’designation is used for export versions.). In theory both missilesbut could be fitted with small nuclear devices. As of 2000, afew hundred DF-15s and DF-11s may be deployed; but most if notall are believe to be equipped with conventional warheads.

CHINA'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES

China maintains one of the largest militaries in the world,based on its inventory of major weapon systems. 4However, the bulk of China's holdings are old in both physicalage and technology. Many weapon systems which came into servicein the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s remain in the inventory today;and all of those systems use 1950s-era technology originally importedfrom the Soviet Union. While China is modernizing its conventionalforces, the new systems are entering are a low rate compared withthe overall size of the older forces. As a result over the nextdecade, as the oldest weapon systems are fully retired, the sizeof China's conventional forces will shrink dramatically.

Ground Forces and Tanks

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is moving toward an overallreduction and reorganization of personnel and equipment with thegoal of creating a more modern and mobile army. In 2000, the totalestimated personnel strength of the Chinese military is 2.5 million,of which 1.8 million are in service with the PLA (ground forces).The ground forces are divided into 7 military regions with 27military districts. Within the 7 military regions lie 21 GroupArmies, each containing about 60,000 personnel. The Group Armiescontain among them 44 infantry divisions, 13 infantry brigades,10 armored divisions, 12 armored brigades, 5 artillery divisions,20 artillery brigades, and 7 helicopter regiments. In addition,5 infantry divisions, 2 infantry brigades, 1 armored brigade,1 artillery division, 3 artillery brigades, and 3 anti-aircraftartillery (AAA) brigades are independent elements of the PLA notassigned to any specific Group Army. There are also three airbornedivisions, which are manned by the PLAAF. 5

There are also numerous reserveand paramilitary units, some of which do not fall under the directcontrol of the PLA. The PLA reserve component has about 1.2 millionpersonnel divided into 50 infantry, artillery, and air-defensedivisions. In addition, approximately 1.1 million personnel servein the People's Armed Police, which includes internal securityand border defense forces under the control of the Ministry ofDefense. The People's Armed Police is organized into 45 divisions.The reserve forces and the People's Armed Police are expectedto increase in size in the near future as active units are shiftedto reserve status under China's modernization and restructuringplan. 6

China's tank inventory hasnumbered around 10,000 for three decades. IDDS estimates the sizeof China's tank force as of 1 January 2000 at 10,100.

Over the past 30 years, most Soviet World War II-vintagetanks (the T-34/85 and the IS-2) have been retired. Initially,these were replaced with large numbers of Soviet T-54/-55s andChinese-produced versions of the T-54/-55 (Types 59/69/79). Ofthese, the Type 59 was the most common, with over 8,000 builtfor the PLA. Production of the Type 59 began in the late 1950sand probably continued into the early 1980s. The subsequent models,Type 69 and Type 79, made their first public appearances in 1982and 1984, respectively; but despite being produced nearly 30 yearsafter the original Type 59, they were not much more capable thantheir predecessor.

In 1988, the Type 80 was readyfor production. The Type 80 represented China’s first majorbreak from the original T-54/-55 design. It features a computerizedfire-control system, a laser range-finder, a gun stabilizer, bettersuspension and power plant, and night-fighting equipment. Thetank currently in production is the Type 85-II/III, which wasintroduced in the early 1990s as a further development of theType 80. In addition to the Type 80’s electronic and powerplant improvements, the Type 85 has an automatic loading system,which reduces the crew to from 4 to 3. The most recent designto come out of China is the Type 90-II, first revealed in late1991, which resembles the Russian T-72 and is believed to be similarin performance. The Type 90-II has yet to enter full production,and it is not expected to do so in the near future for PLA service. 7

China also has a nearly 2,000light tanks. Again, these tanks are copies of old Soviet models:the Type 62 is a scaled down version of the Type 59, while theType 63 is based on the Soviet amphibious PT-76. Both enteredproduction in China in the early 1960s.

The active Chinese tank inventorymay be smaller than the 10,100 holdings estimated by IDDS. Withproduction having started before 1960, many of the 6,000 Type59s still in service could be over 40 years old. Many are probablynot operational due to poor construction and maintenance. In fact,China's history of poor maintenance may also put into questionthe operational status of some of its newer equipment as well.In any event, as a product of the new Chinese military strategyand the higher tank cost per unit, China seems to be replacingolder systems on a less than one-for-one basis, moving slowlytowards a much smaller, and somewhat more modern force. Chinamay eventually mass produce the Type 90-II, instead of the Type85-II/-III, for replacing the bulk of its older tanks. Alternatively,China may be working on an even more advanced tank model, whichwould further reduce the gap in technical capabilities comparedwith Western tank designs.

Air Forces and Combat Aircraft

The People's Liberation Army Air Force, PLAAF, currently possessesabout 4,350 aircraft, of which the majority are combat aircraft.IDDS estimates that the inventory of Chinese combat aircraft on1 January 2000 includes the following: 1900 J-6/MiG-19 (all rolesand models: fighter, reconnaissance, trainer); 720 J-7/MiG-21(all roles and models: fighter, reconnaissance, trainer); 222J-8I/II/III; 55 J-11/Su-27SK; 440 Q-5 (modified MiG-19); 307 H-5/Il-28;and 142 H-6/Tu-16. 8Small numbers of JH-7s (fewer than 12) and K-8s (10-15) may alsobe in service. Of these aircraft, the great majority (J-6 andJ-7) are of types which began to be deployed before 1972 (SeeChart 2.) With the exception of 10 Il-76s, the airlift capabilitiesof the Chinese Airforce are limited to old Soviet tactical airliftplanes built under license or reversed-engineered in China, suchas the Y-5/An-2, Y-7/An-24, and Y-8/An-12.

Much confusion exists as tothe direction China will take in the future regarding combat aircraftacquisition. The Chinese government has made a priority of thedevelopment of a local aerospace industry capable of producingtechnologically advanced aircraft. However, the results producedby the Chinese aircraft industry to date have not been promising.Despite decades of work, the only original combat aircraft tobe designed and produced in China are the J-8 and JH-7, both ofwhich took so long to develop that by the time they entered service,they were already obsolete by Western standards. The newer J-10,which has been in development for twenty years, probably won'tenter service for another five years.

China is by no means uniquein this respect. Except for the five largest industrial arms producers(the USA, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany), other countriesthat have attempted to produce indigenously designed combat aircraft,such as Israel, South Africa, India, Taiwan, and South Korea,have abandoned these efforts and returned to importing systemsfrom one of the five main producers. The basic reason is thatthe economies of scale required to finance research, development,and production of all the systems and sub-systems that make uptoday’s frontline combat aircraft are not available to smallerindustrial countries nor to large developing countries with smallerGNPs and smaller industrial bases. (In fact, for this reason,Russia is lagging increasingly behind the West in most areas ofmilitary technology.) 9

As a result of the inabilityof the Chinese aircraft industry to produce indigenously designed,technologically advanced combat aircraft, the Chinese governmenthas partially reversed its policy of relying on domestic armsproduction and has renewed imports of combat aircraft from Russia—specifically,Su-27s and Su-30s—in small numbers. Over the next decade,China will produce Su-27s, with the Chinese designation J-11,under license from Russia. Up to 200 Su-27s may be built, butthe total may be curtailed if China obtains licensing rights tothe Su-30, which offers several technological advances over theSu-27. China currently plans to buy 30–60 Su-30MKs. 10In addition, China will continue to pursue its own aviation projects.Production of the latest model of the J-8 will continue in smallbatches. The JH-7 may also be produced in greater numbers, ifPLAAF or PLAN can find a role for the aircraft in their inventories.The J-10 is scheduled to enter service around 2005 with initialreports of expected production up to 300 aircraft (depending inpart on the progress of the Su-27 program). In any case, the J-10and the J-11/Su-27 are expected to form the mainstay of the ChineseAir Force in the early 21st century.

Of great significance is China'splan to buy one-to-four AWAC aircraft from Israel. 11If China purchases just one copy of the aircraft, which is aninsufficient number for operational use, it will still providean opportunity for the PLAAF to experience the use of airbornecommand and control. China is also making progress in in-flightrefueling, and several H-6/Tu-16 bombers and Y-8/An-12 transportshave been converted to tankers. As is the case for AWAC aircraft,more acquisitions of tankers will be needed if China seeks toobtain the capability to conduct combat aircraft operations atany distance from its own territory.

Naval Vessels

Submarines: China embarked on a large submarine buildingprogram in the 1960s, which tapered-off in the late 1980s, whichincluded many diesel-electric patrol submarines and some nuclearpowered submarines. Many of the diesel-electric submarines fromthat construction period are now in reserve. Recently, constructionand acquisition of new submarines has begun to intensify. In thenear future, China’s submarine fleet is expected to be smaller,but more modern. (SeeChart 3.)

For most of its history, thePeople’s Army Liberation Navy (PLAN) submarine fleet hasconsisted of small coastal patrol submarines and domesticallyproduced versions of the Soviet 'Romeo' class sub. Initially lackingany real ASW capability, the Chinese 'Romeo' class (Type 033)is now outclassed by nearly every ASW system deployed by China'sneighbors. In all, 73 Romeos were built for use by China between1962 and 1987. 12Of these about 38 remain in active duty, although they may onlygo out to sea a few days per year. Another 30 are in varying conditionsof reserve status. One Romeo was modified to carry six YJ-1 (C-801)anti-ship missiles, but it must surface to fire them.

In the 1970s, China embarkedon a program to domestically produce submarines of its own design.The first of these was the 'Ming' class (Type 035), produced from1971 to 1979, with production resuming again in 1987. The Mingsare not much better in capability than their Romeo predecessors,although they are of newer construction. Submarines of the Song(Type 039) follow-on class are slighter larger than the Ming andincorporate streamlined hull for better submerged performance.The first Song was commissioned in 1999, and two more are nowunder construction. Later models may incorporate design featuresfrom the Kilos. The Song class may be fitted with a version ofthe C-801 or C-802 anti-ship missile that is capable of submergedlaunch. In addition, China has purchased 4 Kilo class submarinesfrom Russia. Additional purchases of Kilos or the newer 'Amur'class from Russia may depend on the progress of the Song class.

Like China’s effort withthe Xia SSBN, China's first attempt to domestically produce anuclear-powered attack submarine produced disappointing results.The 'Han' class (Type 091) first entered service in 1974. Again,power plant problems plagued the class, and the next ship in theclass was not commissioned until 1980. The fifth and final shipdid not enter service until 1990. Despite their problems, whichmay have been fixed, and the long delays in construction, Chinaseems committed to deploying the five subs built. The follow-onType 093 class is expected to build on the experience from theHan class and on assistance from Russian submarine builders. Theclass will be similar in capability to the Russian Victor III,first deployed in 1978. The first Type 093 is scheduled to enterservice in 2004.

Surface Warships: Since the 1972, the number of shipsand overall tonnage of China’s surface combatants has increasedat a steady rate. The increase is expected to continue for thenext five years, but may decline after that if no new constructionor acquisition programs are undertaken.(SeeChart 4.)The most recent additions to the Chinese Navy aretwo Russian-built 'Sovremenny' class destroyers. These ships,the first of which was delivered in February 2000, are the largestand most powerful surface warships ever operated by the ChineseNavy. Their most formidable weapon is the SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonicsea-skimming ASM, of which eight are carried. The Sovremenny isalso armed with the SA-N-7 'Gadfly', which will give China a limitednaval air-defense capability. Up to now, China has possessed onlyshort-ranged SAMs of French or domestic design.

The newest Chinese-built destroyersare two 6,000 ton 'Luhai' class. The first ship of the class enteredservice in late 1999, and the second is expected to enter servicein 2000. Two more are planned with commissioning dates in 2002and 2003. 13

China operates 18 other destroyersof two principle classes. The 4,200 ton 'Luhu' class was the basisfor the 'Luhai' class. Two ships were built, with commissioningdates in 1994 and 1996, respectively, although they were originallyordered in 1985. (Construction was delayed to allow for completionof a frigate order from the Thai Navy.) The Luhus are armed with8 C-802 ASMs, a domestically built Crotale SAM launcher, whichFrance provided copies of in the 1980s, ASW torpedoes and mortars,and many guns. They are also capable of carrying 2 Harbin Zhi-9Ahelicopters, which are used for ASW and anti-ship missions.

The largest class of destroyersis the 16 'Luda' I/II/III class (3,670-3,730 tons). These shipsare armed with 6 C-201 ASMs, ASW torpedoes and mortars, and aheavy gun armament. The Luda II replaces the aft-most 130 mm and37 mm gun turrets with a helicopter pad and hangar. The sole LudaIII carries the C-801 instead of the less capable C-201. Two ofthe class have been fitted with a Crotale launcher. Others maybe fitted in due course, but priority is being given to the constructionof additional ships.

The remaining major surfacecombatants comprise 37 frigates. As is the case for the destroyers,the frigates are designed mainly for anti-surface warfare andlack any significant self-defense (AAW or ASW) capabilities. Thenewest and most capable frigates are the 6 'Jiangwei' class ships(2,250 tons). Their armament is similar to the 'Luhu' class, butwith fewer guns and missiles. They are capable of carrying a singleDauphin helicopter. The first of these ships was laid down in1990. Three more are now under construction, with 2 more planned.

There are 31 units of the oneother type of frigate in service, the 1,702 ton 'Jianghu' class.The class has four sub-groups: the Jianghu I (27 in service) carry4 C-201 ASMs, 2-4 100 mm guns, plus varying numbers of lightercaliber guns; the sole Jianghu II replaces aft armament with ahelicopter hanger; and the 3 Jianghu III/IVs replace the C-201with 8 C-801 or C-802 ASMs.

Amphibious Assault Ships: China's amphibious assaultcapabilities are very limited. As of 1 January 2000, China hasonly 49 amphibious assault ships with full displacements of 1,000tons or more (with three more ships under construction). (SeeChart 5.) Of these, 42 are under 2,000 tons, and none is largerthan 4,800 tons. Many are quite old, including 3 ex-US Navy LSTsbuilt between 1942 and 1945.

This small fleet size excludesany possibility of China attempting to seize control of Taiwanby means of an amphibious assault. Moreover, there is no signthat China is building or planning to build the larger troop andcargo ships which would be necessary for a large-scale attack.Similarly, China's small force of marines (about 5,000) indicatesthat an expansion of amphibious assault capabilities is not expected.

Overall, the Navy is gainingthe most from recent increases in Chinese military spending. Potentiallythe most ambitious naval program is the possible purchase or constructionof aircraft carriers. If and when China acquires an aircraft carrierfor active deployment, it will probably be a conventional take-offand landing (CTOL) type, since China does not have access to verticaland short take-off and landing (V/STOL) aircraft, such as theBritish Sea Harrier. The smallest CTOL carrier currently in serviceis the Brazilian Minas Gerais, at 20,000 tons. However,China would probably want to use its new Su-27/J-11 and possiblyJ-10 fighters on any carrier, which would require a flight-decklonger than that on the Brazilian ships. Current estimates placethe size of the needed ship at 45,000 to 50,000 tons, which wouldput it in the same category as the Russian Kuznetsov orthe French Charles de Gaulle. 14Russian design assistance has been sought for the Chinese carrierprogram and China has studied the ex-Australian carrier Melbourne,which it was towed to China for scrap. 15China also purchased the ex-Soviet carrier Kiev in May2000. China is expected to deploy a carrier capable of carrying24 fighter planes plus helicopters in the support role. The shipis likely to be conventionally powered, since China has limitedexperience with nuclear power in submarines only. According topress reports, the first Chinese carrier could be in service by2005, with a second in service by 2009. Additional carriers couldfollow every three years. 16

China also plans to strengthenits surface fleet through the purchase of additional destroyerfrom Russia: In addition to the two "off the shelf"Sovremennys already bought, China plans to acquire two more SovremennyDDGs with modifications. The delivery dates are unknown. 17

POTENTIAL CHINESE USES OF ARMED FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN

The West’s concern about China's military capability isfocused mainly on potential military action against Taiwan. Chinahas threatened to take military action if Taiwan declares independencefrom the mainland or indefinitely prolongs the unification process.While the modernization of China’s military forces currentlyunder way may facilitate a potential attack on Taiwan, it doesnot make success a forgone conclusion for the foreseeable future.Reviewing potential uses of armed force by China, this sectionconcludes not only that Chinese capabilities are limited now,but also that given the slow pace of modernization, China's capabilitiesfor attack on Taiwan are likely to remain limited for the next10-15 years.

Combined Arms Attack and Invasion

In theory, China could launch a combined arms amphibious andairborne assault on Taiwan. China’s current forces do notinclude enough transport assets to accomplish such a task, however;and there is no evidence that China is building up larger numbersof amphibious assault ships or large cargo aircraft. Current militarydoctrine calls for a 5-to-1 attacker to defender ratio for amphibiousassaults. Today China can only transport 1 armored or 3 infantrybrigades with its amphibious ships, which would be completelyinadequate for an attack on Taiwan. The use of commercial andfishing vessels (for example, splitting a company of troops among4 fishing trawlers) could not substitute effectively due to communicationproblems and the resulting inability to coordinate units. An amphibiousassault would only be conducted with control the skies over theStrait, which the Chinese Air Force probably cannot accomplish.The weather and terrain of Taiwan favors the defender, with highwaves and wind in the Taiwan Strait, combined with cliffs on theeastern part of Taiwan and expansive mudflats on the western coast.Finally, Taiwan and the United States could see an invasion comingmany months before the event, because it would take that longto prepare if China did have the forces to attempt the effort.

Missile Attack

China could attack Taiwan with a few hundred DF-15 and DF-11conventionally armed missiles; but history suggests that suchan attack would probably not force Taipei to capitulate (compare,for example, Britain in 1944-45, or Serbia in 1999). These missilesare not accurate enough to be precision weapons against airfields,radar, transport nodes, etc. They would have to be used more asa terror weapon, against cities and town. if only conventionalwarheads were used, damage would not be any more significant thanthat from a large natural disaster, such as the one Taiwan survivedin 1999 (a major earthquake near Taipei). Since China only hasa limited number of DF-15 and DF-11 missiles, a long-lasting missilesiege would be difficult.

Blockade

China's navy could attempt to blockade Taiwan, forcing shipsto dock at Chinese ports before proceeding on to the island. Ifthe number of China’s large surface ships (frigates and destroyers)continues to increase, such a blockade would be easier. Chinacurrently has more ships than Taiwan, and could attempt to enforcea blockade with a combination of naval vessels and mines. Anddespite the lack of sophistication of China's submarines, Taiwanhas limited ASW assets to counter China's large submarine fleet.As with a missile attack, a blockade would bring internationalcondemnation and, as a result, hurt China's economy, even if itwere technically legal under international law (with Taiwan recognizedas part of China).

CONCLUSIONS

China's military is modernizing, but there are distinct limitsto the modernization program. First, the current force structureis so old that the rate of retirement will exceed the rate ofacquisition in all major weapons categories, with the possibleexception of major surface combatants. This means that the sizeof China’s armed forces will continue a recent pattern ofdecline, and to drop quite steeply in some cases, such as combataircraft. The only exception may be China's surface combat ships.(SeeChina versus Region charts.)

Second, the modernization isproceeding slowly and in a piecemeal manner. All military forcestake a significant amount of time to integrate new weapon systemsinto its forces; for China the process seems to take longer thanmost.

Third, China is adding onlya handful of modern systems to its inventory. New systems arepurchased in small batches or singly, which is cannot dramaticallychange the balance of power. Moreover, while "modern"relative to existing Chinese systems, current acquisitions fromRussia are not as capable as the comparable systems fielded bythe United States or even Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan (in someareas).

Finally, China's military modernizationplan has highlighted the inability of the indigenous arms industryin China to produce the advanced technology weapon systems thatthe military wants. The recent return to dependence on foreignassistance (specifically, aircraft and naval vessels from Russia,and technical assistance from Israel) runs contrary to the Chinesegovernment’s desire to fully control its own military destiny.

China may eventually changeits policies and invest more financial resources in military modernization;but for the foreseeable future, China's potential for militaryaction in Taiwan and other areas will remain limited. China maytake a more active military role in its region, but the overallbalance of power in East Asia will remain unchanged.

China versus Region

Endnotes

1. William Arkin, "Nuclear Notebook:Chinese nuclear forces, 1999," Bulletin of the AtomicScientists Vol. 55, No. 4 (May/June 1999).

2. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, ibid,and Federation of American Scientists website: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/icbm/index.html.

3. Doug Thacher, "IDDS Web Report:Chinese Naval Forces 2000," referencing news report FBIS-CHI-1999-1207,Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies website: http://www.idds.org/idds-mainpages/database/samples-database/china/chinesenavalforces2000.html(May 2000).

4. IDDS estimates a continued high levelof holdings for China's tanks and combat aircraft due to the continuedpresence of those systems in China's inventory. IDDS holdingsestimates do not reflect the readiness status or maintenance ofthe weapon systems; they indicate the total number of systemsat military bases around the country. Some Chinese weapon systemsmay not have been used in years, having been placed in storageareas. For example some J-6s (MiG-19) sit on airfield tarmacsfor months at a time; many of these aircraft may not be in flyingcondition.

5. International Institute for StrategicStudies, Military Balance 1999-2000, p. 186.

6. Ibid.

7. Jane's Armour and Artillery 1999-2000,p. 4.

8. IDDS shows a high level of retentionfor older Chinese aircraft, especially the J-6, because the rateof retirement is not known. The numbers of active units for theseaircraft may be much lower.

9. Randall Forsberg, ed. The Arms ProductionDilemma: Contraction and Restraint in the World Combat AircraftIndustry (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1994), p. 243.

10. Washington Post, "Russians helpChina modernize its arsenal", p. A17, 2/10/2000.

11. While the Israeli AWAC aircraft isbased on the Il-76, the United States is trying to block the saleof the plane to China on the grounds that the radar contains restrictedU. S. components. (Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1999-2000,p. 354).

12. Jane's Fighting Ships 1999-2000,p. 118.

13. IDDSDatabase of World Arms Holdings, Production, and Trade 1972-2000,with Projections to 2010, April 2000.

14. Agence France Presse (AFP), "China'sfirst aircraft carrier", 1/12/00.

15. Jane's Fighting Ships 1999-2000,p. 119.

16. AFP, "China's first aircraft carrier",1/12/00.

17. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 'TaKung Pao' web site, Hong Kong, 2/15/00, 2/17/00.