Same bed, different dreams? | SCMP

The Crawford summit between President Jiang Zemin and US President George W. Bush has passed with little fanfare. From the outset, Mr Jiang's visit was overshadowed by other events in and outside the United States.

Immediately before the summit, North Korea's surprising admission about its nuclear weapons programme captured world attention. When Mr Jiang arrived, Americans were still obsessed with tracking down the Washington sniper. The meeting itself was sidelined by the sudden death of senator Paul Wellstone, as well as the hostage crisis in Moscow. Perhaps to the dismay of Chinese officials, Mr Jiang's visit drew only minimal coverage by mainstream US media outlets, in sharp contrast to his much-publicised 1997 visit.

Indeed, much has changed regarding China's position in US foreign policy in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks: US-China relations have moved from the centre to the margin of the American public's radar screen. This is not necessarily bad news for China.

Without much scrutiny and noise from the US Congress and the public, officials in both countries have quietly accomplished a remarkable turnaround that was unimaginable before these events. The Crawford summit further consolidates this movement.

Progress in many areas was made even before the meeting. Lucrative business contracts were signed. Some Tibetan political prisoners were released. An FBI liaison office will be set up in Beijing. Dialogue on security and human rights will be intensified and military-to-military exchanges will be resumed. At the summit, the two leaders expressed their willingness to co-operate on the issues of Iraq, North Korea and international terrorism.

Vice-President Dick Cheney will visit China next spring. It is reported that President Bush also accepted an invitation to visit China again. Even American political discourse about China has begun to change. Instead of debating whether China is a friend or foe, the New York Times now asks a question that seemed unthinkable just a short while ago: ''Has China become an ally?'' Secretary of State Colin Powell suggested an answer when he recently called China a ''friend''.

The intimate body language between Mr Bush and Mr Jiang seemed to confirm this friendship, even if they are not yet ''old friends''. On the surface, the turnaround resembles the cyclical pattern of the relationship under a new US administration. One might argue the normalisation under the Bush administration came even sooner than under the Clinton administration, a process that took more than one term to finish. Yet the dynamics underlining this transformationare not quite the same. September 11 changed the priority of US foreign policy and infused positive energy into the relationship. Both sides again found a common threat.

China's co-operation to a certain degree in the war on terror modified Mr Bush's perception of China in particular and major power relations in general. Moreover, as the summit illustrated, while it is true that China needs the United States more than the other way around, the US does need China's help in handling a wide range of international issues. More important to the stabilisation of the relationship, however, is China's non-confrontational strategic adjustment that allowed Beijing to swallow some bitter pills on Taiwan and other issues in the face of Bush administration's more assertive posture.

American observers noticed this causal linkage. A positive interpretation is that China's foreign policy became more confident and mature. Others simply described China's restraint as a victory of Mr Bush's tough policy that made China realise the price of messing with the world's hyperpower. Consequently, the United States could win Chinese concessions and co-operation on various issues without necessarily accommodating China's concerns.

The Crawford summit continues this asymmetric pattern of interaction.

Mr Bush sought Mr Jiang's support on North Korea, Iraq, and the war against terror. He got much of what he asked for. What did China get in return? Not much, except granting President Jiang the respect and prestige of meeting him three times within a year and becoming the fourth foreign leader to visit Mr Bush's Texas ranch.

After Beijing published several sets of unprecedented regulations on export control of weapons-related material, Washington still refused to lift bans on launching US satellites by Chinese companies. While both countries share common interests in anti-nuclear proliferation and anti-terrorism measures, they clearly have different national priorities.

The Taiwan issue, for example, was not initially on Mr Bush's agenda. It trailed all other issues in his after-summit statement. Mr Bush's articulation of the ''one China'' policy at the press conference was incomprehensible. Only after prompting did he indicate that the US does not support Taiwanese independence. In contrast, Mr Jiang told his counterpart that nothing is more important for the future of US-China relations than the Taiwan issue.

Mr Jiang, as always, emphasised the importance of handling the relationship from a strategic height and with a long-term perspective. But this is exactly what the summit lacked. Overall, it was an issue-oriented summit. Each side expressed its positions on a ''laundry list'' of concerns.

This shows the inherent limitation of the relationship. The United States is still reluctant to use the term ''strategic'' to describe the relationship, although it sees importance in the practical gain of having stable relations in the midst of the war against terror. The hardliners in the Bush administration may still think of China as an adversary. They prefer an issue-oriented approach and shun a new communique, or even a joint statement with China, to set the strategic direction for the relationship.

For some Americans, China seems only to exist to help the United States manage crises. The relationship per se is not that important. China has long sought to reach a strategic understanding with the United States, but Beijing is still not quite sure how to achieve this goal. It is also quite obsessed with a single issue - Taiwan. An issue-oriented relationship, without strategic understandings, is unlikely to withstand the test of time. The Crawford summit might be a success in its own terms, but the foundation of the relationship remains fragile.

Wang Jianwei is a Professor and Chair of the Political Science Department at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point. He is the author of Limited Adversaries: Post-Cold War Sino-American Mutual Images, Oxford University Press, 2000.